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ABSTRACT 
Maintenance Resource Management (MRM) training for aviation mechanics has 
become mandatory in many industrialized countries since 1998. Yet, to date, MRM 
training remains optional in the U.S. Interestingly, a similar safety discipline, 
namely Crew/Cockpit Resource Management (CRM), is mandatory for pilots, flight 
engineers, flight attendants, and dispatchers and is regulated in the Federal Aviation 
Administration’s (FAA) Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs). If MRM training is 
important to enhance aviation technicians’ working behavior, the rationale to not 
regulate it opens a window for study. This research aims to inductively investigate 
the FAA’s regulatory rationale concerning MRM training based on direct inputs 
from the FAA’s Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) members. 
Delphi methodology associated with purposive sampling technique was adopted. 
The result revealed that the FAA cannot regulate MRM because the aviation 
industry is strongly opposed to it due to the lack of training budgets, the need of a 
quantifiable cost-effect analysis, concern over the FAA’s inspection workforce, an 
ongoing voluntary alternative called the Air Transportation Surveillance System 
(ATOS), the government’s lower priority on maintenance after 9/11, and the 
airlines’ tight embracement of operational flexibility without regulation. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Alongside the prompt development of the air transportation system in 
the U.S., aviation safety has always been the foremost concern of the 
government (Carmody, 2001; Donnelly, 2001), the general public (Bowers, 
1997; Wells, 1999), as well as the air transportation industry itself (Proctor,  
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1999). Since 1978, the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act (the nature of 
laissez-faire and free marketing) has forced airlines to further promote, or at 
least maintain, a required level of safety in order to compete with business 
rivals, to provide better operations, to survive, and most importantly, to 
become profitable (Button & Stough, 2000; Chang, 1986; Marks, 1999). 
However, today’s airline passengers tend to book their flights based on price 
either via the Internet or from traditional travel agencies (Johnston, 2001). In 
response, airlines have reacted by providing services that charge the lowest 
possible fares in order to attract more customers and ultimately survive in the 
Darwinian post-deregulation battlefield. However, maintaining a risk-free 
operation needs a sufficient financial backup. While charging passengers 
airfare with marginal or no profit, airlines may provide safety training for 
their employees only to satisfy the minimum mandatory requirements from 
the FAA. Providing non-regulatory safety training could become a financial 
burden to airlines. 
REVIEW OF MAINTENANCE PERFORMANCE AND SAFETY 
TRAINING 
The accident investigation of the fatal mishap of Alaska Airlines Flight 
261 in January 2000 is pointing to flawed jackscrew lubrication and rushed 
inspection (Finnegan, 2002; Fiorino, 2001). After Alaska Airlines’ accident, 
many aviation enthusiasts see again that the goal of zero accidents cannot be 
achieved without the cooperation of  hazard-free maintenance. The fact is 
that Alaska Airlines’ accident, which may be a result of non-flight errors, is 
not an isolated case in aviation history. The accidents of TWA Flight 800, 
ValuJet Flight 592, and Air Midwest Flight 5481 had alerted the air 
transportation industry that non-flight operation does play a significant role 
in today’s aviation safety (Lu, 2001; Alexander, 2004). As a result, the task 
of eliminating non-flight errors cannot be overemphasized. 
 
Maintenance Human Errors 
The main purpose of aircraft maintenance is to keep aircraft airworthy 
(King, 1986). Although technologies have been enhanced, aircraft 
maintenance remains quite challenging and the working environment is still 
extremely intense (Butterworth-Hayes, 1997; Delp, Watkins, & Kroes, 1994; 
Richardson, Rodwell, & Baty, 1995). With this in mind, human factors 
affecting maintenance performance are inherent and should be treated 
carefully. A survey conducted by Boeing Company and other safety 
researchers revealed that the main factors contributing to maintenance 
mistakes were the following: (a) boredom; (b) failure to understand 
instructions well; (c) rushing; (d) pressure from management; (e) fatigue; (f) 
distractions at critical times; (g) shift work; (h) poor communication; (i) use 
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of incorrect parts and tools; and (j) unauthorized maintenance proceedings 
(Al-Almoudi, 1998; Taylor & Christensen, 1998). In addition, Transport 
Canada’s human factors research resulted in the recognition of a so-called 
Dirty Dozen—lack of communication, lack of teamwork, lack of knowledge, 
lack of resource, lack of assertiveness, lack of awareness, fatigue, stress, 
distraction, pressure, complacency, and workplace norms—that identifies the 
human factors requiring immediate attention (Grant, 1995). Wood (1997) 
and Drury (1999; n.d.) echoed this and further reported the major problems 
of aviation maintenance technicians (AMTs)—fatigue, physical impediment, 
foreign object damage, ignorance, misconduct, and overlook—when 
conducting aircraft maintenance/inspections. Hence, when working on an 
aircraft, AMTs could make mistakes and are not error-free (Wood, 1997). 
The nature of aircraft maintenance is complex and needs physical and 
mental strength. The working climate is tense, involving managerial 
pressure, working efficiency, shift work, interpersonal communication, and 
external sociological influences (Lu, 2001). Without a doubt, the 
maintenance issues associated with human factors are almost identical to 
those that affect flight performance—communication, workload, fatigue, 
stress, social environment, physical limitations, and personal health (Orlady 
& Orlady, 1999). 
 
Maintenance Resource Management 
Like CRM training for pilots and associated flight crews, MRM was 
developed based on the experimental findings of human factors research 
introduced by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
in the early 1970s. Human factors studies the interaction between human and 
software (S), hardware (H), environment (E), and liveware (L), thereby 
forming the SHEL model of aviation safety theory (Krause, 1996; see Figure 
1).  
Figure 1. SHEL Model of human factor and aviation safety.1 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
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Federal Aviation Administration, 2000, System safety handbook: Practices and guidelines for 
conducting system safety engineering and management. 
Hardware 
Software 
Liveware 
Human 
Environment 
Performance 
Environment 
 Lu 35 
 
 
 
 
Likewise, maintenance human factors training is an analytical science of the 
factors influencing maintenance performance and consequently seeks to 
eliminate or dilute the negative impact from an explicit safety factor (Orlady 
& Orlady, 1999). Because MRM training originated in the findings of human 
factors research, implementing MRM training could help improve an AMT’s 
performing compatibility, self-awareness, interpersonal communication, and 
effectiveness at resource usage (Capitelli, 1988; Lavitt, 1995; Mudge, 1998; 
Orlady & Orlady, 1999). 
 
Legislative Basis for MRM Training 
Not until 1988, and after Aloha Airlines’ accident resulting from the 
aircraft’s aged fuselage being ripped open in flight, did the FAA conduct the 
first official safety meeting concerning aircraft maintenance. As a result, 
Congress proposed a bill—the Aviation Safety Research Act (H.R. 4686)—
which was passed on November 3, 1988, by the Senate (Public Law 100-
591). This bill provided grants to the FAA and expanded the research 
domain aiming to make a connection between aviation safety and human 
factors (US GPO, 1990). The Aviation Safety Research Act of 1988 sought 
to pursue the relationship between human factors and flying, aviation 
maintenance, and air traffic control (US GPO, 1997). The FAR Part 121 
Subpart N and Special FAR Part 71 Training Program has regulated today’s 
CRM training rooted in the human factors paradigm for flight crews (pilots 
and flight engineers) since 1990. The Aviation Safety Research Act was 
revised in 1996, mandating human factor training for flight attendants and 
dispatchers.  
Moreover, in 1991, three years after the Aloha Airlines accident, 
Congress passed the Airline Passenger Safety Enhancement Act, which 
focused on improving airline maintenance procedures and standards. This 
legislation urged airlines to: (a) reform inspection routines for aging aircraft, 
(b) innovate inspection technology training for maintenance personnel and 
professionalism, and (c) restructure a 15-year inspection development 
(Bowen & Lu, 2000). Unfortunately, Congress did not identify the 
sociological factor behind Aloha’s accident—the oppressive management 
pressure that constrained maintenance time (Friend, 1992). The fatal crash of 
ValuJet Flight 592 in 1996 was due to an oxygen canister fire resulting from 
ill-trained ground crews; it led to the passage of the Aviation Safety 
Protection Act of 1997. Congress proposed another bill, the Aircraft Safety 
Act of 2000 (H.R. 3862), after the tragedy involving Alaska Airlines Flight 
261 in January 2000. This legislative reaction, in the wake of another 
aviation disaster, aimed to prevent fraud involving aircraft maintenance and 
defective parts (Bowen & Lu, 2000). 
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The aviation industry (Capitelli, 1988; Lavitt, 1995; Orlady & Orlady, 
1999) and the FAA (Mudge, 1998) have recognized the benefit of MRM 
training to enhance aircraft maintenance safety. To date, MRM or an 
equivalent training is mandatory in EU nations (Joint Aviation Authority, 
2001) and Canada (Transport Canada, n.d.). A similar training (CRM) for 
flight crews, flight attendants, dispatchers, and flight engineers is mandated 
in the FAA’s FARs. With the legislative foundation upheld by the Aviation 
Safety Research Act, Passenger Safety Enhancement Act, and Aviation 
Safety Protection Act, the FAA’s non-regulatory stance in relation to MRM 
is worth investigating. Without a mandatory requirement, the current training 
status quo in the aviation industry should be made known to the flying public 
as well. 
Question 1: From the viewpoint of Aviation Rulemaking Advisory 
Committee (ARAC) members, what is the rationale underpinning 
the non-regulatory status of Maintenance Resource Management 
(MRM) training for aircraft maintenance technicians (AMTs)? 
Question 2: What is the de facto safety training and attitude of the 
airlines toward Maintenance Resource Management (MRM) 
training under the current non-regulatory status quo? 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In order to manifest sound theories regarding the rationale of the FAA’s 
decision making, the research questions were thoroughly explored through 
the use of a divergent approach, a qualitative methodology. The author 
selected the Delphi methodology and initiated purposive sampling skills. 
 
Delphi Techniques 
The Delphi method is an exploratory and discursive-format data 
collection tool that allows researchers to gain the highest creditability of data 
through reciprocal procedures (see Figure 2); Bellenger, Bernhardt, & 
Goldstucker, 1976; Rayens & Hahn, 2000; Zapka & Estabrook, 1999). In 
this study, the Delphi technique was directly applied to answer the research 
questions concerning the rationale of decision making and current industry-
wide MRM training. The existing policy determinants can be coined and 
epistemological relations among variables can be identified.  
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Figure 2. Research execution processing – the flowchart of policy Delphi  
 
 
 
Purposive Sampling 
In contrast to the widely recognized random sampling approach adopted 
in most quantitative studies, purposive sampling focuses on the heuristic 
exploration and in-depth interview of selected key informants who possess a 
direct connection to various essential data, practical experiences, and 
genuine resources (Babbie, 1998; Maykut & Morehouse, 1994). Key 
informants—as representative units rather than randomly selected samples 
(Bellenger, Bernhardt, & Goldstucker, 1976)—are those who are closely 
involved in the area being studied. In addition, the snowball technique was 
accompanied with the usage of purposive sampling because qualitative 
researchers often start their data collection from the accessible research sites 
of key informants (Babbie, 1998; Berg, 2001; Creswell, 1998; Maxwell, 
1996; Royer & Zarlowski, 1999).  
 
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee 
This study recruited FAA ARAC members as key informants. One of 
the attempts by the federal government to collect public opinion from 
external sources in order to assist policymaking was the passage of the 
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 and the Federal Advisory Committee 
Act (FACA) of 1972 (Adamski & Doyle, 1999). Since 1972, the FAA has 
established various ARACs for different legislative issues such as aged 
aircraft, air traffic control, navigation system, cabin safety, flight operation, 
and maintenance safety. The purpose behind the FAA’s establishment of an 
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ARAC is to build a communicative channel between the federal government, 
the public, and the aviation industry under the power of the FACA. ARAC 
members are also assigned with a task that focuses on regulatory 
communication and harmonization between the FAA FARs, Canadian 
Aviation Regulation (CAR), and Europe’s Joint Aviation Regulation (JAR). 
This study selected fourteen ARAC members who worked with the FAA 
regarding mandatory maintenance human factors training (formerly 
proposed by the FAA as FAR Part 66). Unfortunately, three of the selected 
ARAC members could not participate in this study, resulting in an eleven-
member Delphi panel. 
 
Data evaluation methods 
Coding is a systematic procedure for finding the significant meanings, 
norms, or unique themes of texts by cross-references and comparisons 
(Creswell, 1998; Gough & Scott, 2000). For grounded-theory type 
qualitative research, like that which uses the Delphi methodology, the design 
of topical subquestions can be considered the blueprint of qualitative data 
analysis (QDA) and meaningful coding (Maxwell, 1998; Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Tafoya, 1986). In this study, computer software is useful 
to examine the reliability of data analysis. EZ-Text software was applied to 
manage database and to compile the index of coding reliability (CDC, 1998).  
 
Reliability and validity of the research 
The reliability of this project rests in the category of research 
consistency in addition to EZ-Text’s index. This consistency involved the 
key researcher’s operational processes of Delphi techniques and the 
informants’ conformability of results (steps 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 in Figure 2). 
Moreover, in addition to external peer-review for validity during the 
questionnaire generation phase, personal biases were clarified and rich and 
thorough descriptions were collected (Berg & Latin, 1994; Creswell, 1998; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985). In this study, in order to gain the highest validity 
and reliability, the initial findings were returned to ARAC panelists for 
review and consequently gained their conformity based on Delphi criterions. 
FINDINGS 
This section outlines the findings after two consecutive personal 
interviews over a six-month period. The key informants, aged between 36 
and 46 years old, have comprised the largest portion of the sample, whereas 
most panelists possess educational level with Bachelor of Science degrees or 
above. All panelists have more than 10 years of working experience in the 
aviation field. Eight of the 11 panelists have received MRM or human 
factors education before the date of the interviews. Panelists have 
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participated in the FAA’s rulemaking activities at least once each year, and 
most of them have taken part in the FAA’s rulemaking activities associated 
with maintenance safety regulations more than three times in the past. A 
brief analysis of the panelists’ backgrounds is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Demographic distribution of panelists (N=11) 
 Number (n**) Descriptor Percentage 
Age    
 6 36-46 years of age 54.5 
 2 47-58 years of age 18.1 
 3 59 years or older 27.4 
Education    
 1 High School diploma 9.1 
 1 Associate degree 9.1 
 3 Bachelor’s degree 26.3 
 5 Graduate degree 46.5 
 1 Doctorate degree 9.1 
Working experience    
 11 10 years or more 100.0 
ARAC activities    
 3 New member 27.3 
 8 Senior member 72.7 
MRM/HF training    
 4 Never received 36.3 
 7 Received 63.6 
Note.  N = total number of panelists 
** n denotes the number of particular panelists 
 
Question 1: From the viewpoint of Aviation Rulemaking Advisory 
Committee (ARAC) members, what is the rationale underpinning the non-
regulatory status of Maintenance Resource Management (MRM) training for 
aircraft maintenance technicians (AMTs)? 
After the interviews and data coding process, the synthetic findings from 
the ARAC members were grounded. The panelists concurred that the 
following six policy determinants played a central role in the FAA’s 
rulemaking in light of the current non-mandatory MRM or maintenance 
human factors education.  
1. Budgetary constraints. The FAA should have to consider the possible 
cost and how that would impact the air transportation industry’s current and 
future financial status. In particular, air carriers are facing ongoing financial 
difficulties that impede them from accepting any new regulations. 
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2. Lacking a persuasive cost-benefit analysis result. There is no strong 
or virtually quantifiable data showing a positive cost-benefit result from 
MRM. Therefore, lacking sound evidence, the air transportation industry 
would be reluctant to support such regulation. 
3. The effective operation of the Air Transportation Oversight System. 
Despite its nature of volunteerism that requires the industry’s participation 
from the bottom-up, the ongoing safety inspection mechanism—ATOS—is 
sufficient in maintaining a reasonable degree of aircraft maintenance safety.  
4. The air transportation industry’s demand for operational flexibility. 
The air transportation industry demands more operational flexibility to 
accomplish safety goals without coercion from the government. In addition, 
different categories within the industry would like to conduct their own 
safety training that focuses on specific needs. The standardized procedures 
and activities of MRM could hinder creative means to accomplish the goal of 
maintenance safety. 
5. The FAA’s capacity and the capability of safety inspectors. The 
FAA’s safety inspection capacity and the capability of safety inspectors is 
one of the policy determinants that hampers the FAA in mandating MRM 
and the industry in upholding its proposed regulations. First, the FAA has 
long been criticized by the industry regarding the capability of their safety 
inspectors. Second, since the FAA is suffering manpower shortage of safety 
inspectors, new MRM regulations could worsen the situation since the FAA 
would have to dispatch more safety inspectors to scrutinize the industry’s 
MRM training compliance. 
6. Low policy priority. After 9/11, the FAA’s manpower and budgetary 
resources had been reallocated to airport security and related safety issues. 
Most regulatory proposals petitioned by the government are mainly in favor 
of enhancing airport security as well as homeland security. National security 
and anti-terrorism activities had outweighed the importance of regulating 
MRM or maintenance human factors training. 
 
Question 2: What is the de facto safety training and attitude of the airlines 
toward MRM training under the current non-regulatory status quo? 
Based on the ARAC key informants’ input, major air carriers voluntarily 
participate in the ATOS system; yet small/regional airlines and fixed based 
operators (FBOs) do not or only occasionally provide MRM or related 
training. Regardless of the major air carriers’ engagement in ATOS 
surveillance, “when considering the degree of MRM training without 
regulation, a voluntary MRM conducted by the industry seems sporadic,” as 
stated by one panelist. Some panelists echoed and noted that the most critical 
elements impeding the industry’s voluntary implementation of MRM 
training are: (a) current financial hardship; (b) a long-term unpredictable 
cost; and (c) unclear benefits. Therefore, “the industry would like to 
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continuously comment on MRM training via participation in rulemaking 
rather than by supporting MRM regulation,” as remarked by one panelist. 
Regarding Question 2 concerning the contemporary U.S. aviation industry’s 
training status without the regulatory enforcement, several important facts 
were discovered.  
1. A profit-driven industry. Airlines are believed to be “exclusively 
profit-driven” as remarked by one panelist. Hence, the airlines’ willingness 
to “conduct MRM training without federal enforcement is low due to cost 
concerns.” Another panelist stated that “the support of the top management 
and cost-benefit analyses” were considered essential for an airline to decide 
whether or not to implement voluntary safety trainings. “When something is 
non-regulatory it will be done only if the management sees a cost-effect 
case” as echoed by another panelist. “Regional airlines or small FBOs would 
not implement MRM due to a budgetary shortage” as addressed by one 
panelist. However, “the major airlines would like to implement such training 
voluntarily because these airlines already have good technical training 
programs and MRM is a natural extension” as another panelist replied. 
2. The pros and cons of a non-regulatory MRM status. There are some 
disadvantages of maintaining a non-regulatory MRM training, said the panel. 
One panelist pointed out that, “the lack of mandatory MRM training could 
be harmful and risky, and could impact maintenance safety in the long run.” 
Without a doubt, “safety training would enhance safety performance,” 
another panelist replied. Because MRM training focuses on human factors 
related to aircraft maintenance tasks, one panelists stated that “without MRM 
training, the AMTs might unintentionally perform tasks with risks.” Another 
panelist further warned and argued, “not until the industry had encountered 
severe aviation mishaps caused by maintenance errors would the industry 
recognize the importance of communication, teamwork, self-awareness, and 
the dangers of physical fatigue, mental stress, and coercive management.” In 
addition, one panelist stated, “without regulation of MRM or defined 
requirements, organizations wander all over the map in terms of an accurate 
path of [MRM] training.” Moreover, according to panelists’ feedback, there 
are also some advantages if MRM training remains optional in nature. One 
panelist argued, “to some extent, volunteer programs are more stringent than 
regulations.” It is simply because airline services “are influenced multi-
dimensionally” by customers’ changing needs. Therefore, “if training 
requirements are flexible and lax, customer service can be easily and 
continually improved in a timely manner” as echoed by another panelist. Of 
course, not being mandated to do the training means cost saving. One 
panelist stated that “without mandatory enforcement from the government, 
the airlines do not have to conduct safety training and can therefore save on 
operational costs.” The fact is that “a non-mandatory MRM means cost 
reduction,” stated by another panelist. 
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3. The attitude of the industry regarding a mandatory MRM. “The 
industry is opposed to a mandatory MRM training” as one panelist 
addressed. “The air transportation industry is also afraid of any regulations 
because the FAA would possibly take the advantage if they have the 
chance,” another panelist argued. Another panelist said that “any regulations 
without appropriate evidence, showing that MRM would create enough 
return on investments, would be denied” by the industry. Even within the 
regulatory sphere, the industry would “just implement enough training” for 
aircraft technicians as another panelist replied. In particular, while the FAA 
hoped to promote MRM training for aircraft maintenance technicians 
without regulation, “when it comes to the discussion of regulations, the air 
transportation industry would demand a thorough understanding of 
requirements beforehand, such as technical support, training duration, 
possible cost and benefit, and a quantifiable result,” said another panelist. 
 
Reliability Report 
To ensure the reliability of qualitative findings, EZ-Text’s index of 
coding reliability was measured after the completion of the second-round 
interview. According to EZ-Text’s manual (CDC, 1998) and Miles and 
Huberman’s (1994) rule of coding reliability, the percentage of agreement 
between two coded datasets should exceed 90 percent in order to ensure 
reliability. In addition, the Kappa Index should show 1 in the contingency 
table. In Table 2, the percentage of agreement regarding each code (policy 
determinant) is above 98 percent and the Kappa index is 1. This means that 
the coding process of raw data had high reliability across two codebooks. 
Table 2. Reliability Report—Kappa Index 
Codes Percentage of Agreement Kappa Index 
Financial constraint 99.373 1 
Cost-benefit analysis 98.746 1 
ATOS 99.373 1 
FAA's ability 99.687 1 
Operational flexibility 99.373 1 
Policy priority 98.746 1 
 
 
 Lu 43 
 
 
DISCUSSION: THE MODEL OF DECISION-MAKING 
The findings portray a conceptual picture for readers and pull most 
possible independent variables (policy determinants) together arriving at a 
description of the FAA’s rulemaking rationale regarding a mandatory MRM 
training. A schematic chart of relations showing a theoretical construct (from 
processing phase of policy premise finding, agenda setting, implementing 
policy action, to policy evaluation) among all found themes and policy 
determinants is illustrated in Figure 3. 
Figure 3. Schematic relationship among variables 
 
To further explain, this model of decision-making indicates that if the 
financial condition of the aviation industry was healthy or generating 
sufficient profits, the results of cost-benefit analyses would become less 
important. This is because the industry would then have enough monetary 
resources to implement MRM training. Furthermore, regardless of regulatory 
status, without sound evidence yielded from cost-benefit analyses, the 
willingness of supporting a mandatory MRM training is weak because the 
element of budgetary constraint is not compressed nor eliminated.  
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The aviation industry is tightly embracing ATOS on a voluntary basis. 
In addition, the demand for operational flexibility from the air transportation 
industry positively influences the FAA’s decision making. These two 
elements (ATOS and operational flexibility) are impediments to the 
industry’s acceptance of MRM regulation. Certainly, the air transportation 
industry would prefer to maintain the current voluntary nature of its 
cooperation with the FAA without the threat of violations. In addition, the 
industry is concerned with the capacity of FAA’s safety inspectors. The 
shortage and quality of the safety inspectors has been a long-time criticism 
of the FAA’s enforcement actions. If this manpower deficit can be removed, 
some of the resistance of MRM regulation from the industry could be 
reduced. Finally, the FAA will need to take priorities into account when 
enforcing the MRM agenda, especially in light of other priorities resulting 
from 9/11.  
It is believed that—barring a legislative crisis such as a major airline 
accident resulted from the lack of MRM training—these six rulemaking 
determinants largely shape the FAA’s decision-making behavior. 
CONCLUSION 
The core argument of this study is that while resource management or 
human factors training is mandatory for pilots, flight engineers, dispatchers, 
and flight attendants, it is controversial that such training becomes optional 
for AMTs or non-flight workers. A nonregulatory MRM also draws attention 
to the current training status for AMTs. This study has explored the rationale 
behind the FAA’s stance in retaining a non-regulatory MRM or maintenance 
human factors training for the air transportation industry. 
Based on the interview of ARAC members, policy determinants are 
unveiled showing that the FAA should closely evaluate several essential 
issues of the industry when it comes to the debate of proposed regulations. 
Those determinants are identified as (a) the industry’s financial status; (b) a 
sound evidence of cost-benefit analysis; (c) the scope of malleability of the 
ongoing voluntary ATOS; (d) the allowance of operational flexibility for the 
industry; (e) the FAA’s inspection capacity and the ability of inspectors; and 
(f) the level of policy priority. 
Regarding the current training status without regulatory enforcement, 
major air carriers are willing to voluntarily participate in the alternative 
system, namely ATOS. Yet, the regional airlines and FBOs do not intend to 
provide MRM to maintenance technicians due to the cost. Despite the major 
air carriers’ efforts, when considering the degree of MRM training without 
regulation, voluntary MRM conducted by the entire airline industry seems 
rare and difficult. While the industry as a whole does not likely support the 
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MRM regulation, only major airlines with more cash flow or revenue would 
be able to incorporate MRM into their current maintenance safety training.  
Post-9/11, the financial status of the entire industry is increasingly 
fragile. Although ATOS requires a reasonable amount of MRM training for 
non-flight employees, top management would still evaluate the possible 
investment returns in safety training before taking further action. As a result, 
when MRM is non-regulatory, it will be done only when the advantages are 
identified or when sound evidence associated with cost-benefit analyses is 
accessible. 
Finally, it is still possible to regulate MRM training in the future. The 
evidence underpinning this conclusion is the six policy determinants 
described. In other words, when any of the determinants prevails—that is, (a) 
the industry is making enough profits; (b) cost-benefit analysis shows a 
sound result; (c) the FAA has sufficient numbers of qualified inspectors; (d) 
the ATOS does not work well; (e) the FAA decides to grant the industry with 
operational flexibility; or (f) the government is aware of the urgency of such 
regulation—regulating MRM or related ground safety training would 
encounter less resistance. 
 
Limitation 
The results of this study were retrieved from two consecutive rounds of 
interviews with selected panelists from ARAC members who were closely 
involved in the debate of MRM regulation with the FAA. Unfortunately, one 
important resource—FAA’s rule-makers—was not able to take part in this 
research due to a variety of reasons. Thus, future research should focus on 
the data collection and comparison from the FAA rule-makers. Moreover, 
although panelists addressed that the working culture may change if 
technicians receive MRM or maintenance human factors training, evidence 
of this has not been recorded nor is it accessible. The cost-benefit analysis of 
MRM training did play a crucial role in this study. To prepare a report for 
the FAA’s future decision-making, follow-up research should focus on a 
longitudinal assessment of behavioral change, error reduction, and cost 
savings affiliated with MRM training. 
 
Special Notice 
Many aviation researchers have argued that the FAA has been captured 
by the industry (Carmichael, Kutz, & Brown, 2003) based on George J. 
Stigler’s theory. In this study, regardless of the designated personnel from 
the FAA in charge with a specific regulatory provision, the author reviewed 
the backgrounds of ARAC members and discovered that most ARAC 
members are mainly from the industry such as unions, airlines, aviation 
organizations, and manufacturers. As a result of this study, the FAA’s 
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decision-making process was, to a great extent, in favor of the industry and 
was captured accordingly.  
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